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Abstract
Using an analytical model, we investigate the dynamics of a ﬁrm with market
power whose advertisements and sales contribute to its customers’ stock of good-
will. An advertising campaign precedes the ﬁrm’s sales when customers are not
familiar with its product, (e.g., movies), whereas sales of a new brand of a familiar
product may start without advertising (e.g. Crocs shoes). For constant demand
elasticity, both advertising and sales take place from the start. Two diﬀerent types
of solutions then emerge: one for low demand elasticity and one for high demand
elasticity. These solutions are analyzed by phase diagrams. We also perform a
numerical sensitivity analysis.
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11 Introduction
During the 1984 Super Bowl XVIII, the Apple Macintosh personal computer was intro-
duced to the world in a TV commercial that cost 1.5 million dollars. Advertisement
campaigns had also preceded commercial marketing of Window’s 95. Some products,
however, are launched without a single advertisement but yet rapidly become well known
with fast increasing sales, e.g., Crocs shoes. Why did Apple launch an advertising cam-
paign before sales began, whereas Crocs started sales without any advertisement? Under
what circumstances are such strategies optimal? This paper addresses these questions
as well as other similar ones.
To tackle these issues, we develop a dynamic model of a ﬁrm with market power that
is engaged in production, sales and advertising. At each point in time the ﬁrm faces a
downward sloping demand curve, which shifts up and outward with an increase in the
stock of customers’ goodwill for the product. Both advertising and sales are controlled
by the ﬁrm and contribute to the rate of growth of the stock of customer goodwill. This
stock of goodwill has a ﬁnite upper limit and its rate of growth declines with proximity
of the goodwill stock to this upper limit. There is a constant depreciation rate of the
goodwill stock so that sales and/or advertising are needed to prevent the goodwill from
decaying. Such a setup characterizes a sole producer of a good (monopolist) and the sole
producer of a brand of a diﬀerentiated product that engage in monopolistic competition.
Such producers possess market power. We ﬁrst solve the model in general, and afterwards
in greater detail in subsequent models with the same general speciﬁcation but with more
speciﬁc functional forms.
In the literature, models view advertisement as a tool that is controlled by a ﬁrm and
enhances consumers’ demand for the ﬁrm’s diﬀerentiated product and thus increases
the ﬁrm’s sales. Dorfman and Steiner’s (1954) positive model is one of the ﬁrst formal
static models of an advertising monopoly. Most of the earlier advertising static models
2belong to the ‘persuasive view’ that assumes advertising changes the utility function and
creates brand loyalty (e.g., Comanor and Wilson, 1974). Another approach, known as
the ‘informative approach’, assumes that advertisement facilitates purchases by carry-
ing information to consumers. Ozga (1960) and Stigler (1961) laid the foundations to
this methodology and Dukes (2004) elaborated on reasons for its variety of levels. A
third approach assumes advertising directly enters consumers’ preferences in a manner
complementary to the consumption of the advertised product (e.g., Stigler and Becker,
1977, Hochman and Luski, 1988). A comprehensive survey of all this literature can be
found in Bagwell (2005) and references therein.
Static models, however, cannot capture the eﬀects that a ﬁrm’s past performances have
on its current performance, for which dynamic models have been created. One of the
earlier dynamic models is the 1957 Vidale and Wolfe model which maximizes the accu-
mulated discounted net sales while changes in current sales are caused by advertising
and depreciation. The concept of a stock of goodwill inﬂuencing sales was introduced
by Nerlove and Arrow (1962). According to their approach advertising accumulates into
goodwill the same way that investment accumulates into capital stock. For details on
the literature emanating from these two papers see, for example Feichtinger, Hartl and
Sethi (1994), and Feinberg (2001). Another branch of the dynamic marketing literature
concentrates on the process of diﬀusion of sales information by ‘word of mouth’ and
‘repeated sales’ and its adoption.1 In most of these dynamic models, however, the pro-
duction process and demand considerations that constitute the main issues addressed
by static models are ignored and only a single sales variable (that is actually the net
revenue) exists.2
1A comprehensive literature review, which covers these concepts among other, can be found in Sethi
(1977); Dodson and Muller (1978); Bass (1969); Feinberg (2001) and Feichtinger, Hartl and Sethi (1994).
2One of the exceptions is a paper by Hochman and Hochman (1975), which extends Nerlove and
Arrow’s model to include advertising and goodwill stock as well as investment and capital stock.
3In this paper we include the elements of both static and dynamic models. Thus, our
ﬁrm is facing a downward sloping demand curve that is shifted by a change in the stock
of goodwill and the ﬁrm’s cost is a function of the ﬁrm’s output and advertising at
each point in time. In addition, current sales as well as advertising contribute to the
stock of goodwill. We term the process of sales aﬀecting goodwill "learning by buying".
Consequently, our model, unlike the existing literature, includes two processes aﬀecting
consumers’ goodwill: advertising and learning by buying.3
Our results demonstrate the importance of including the demand and production processes
into our dynamic model. It turns out that two diﬀerent strategies for new ﬁrms exist
in our solution: One strategy is for ﬁrms facing low demand elasticity and the other is
for ﬁrms facing high demand elasticity. The strategies diﬀer in the investment rate in
advertising relative to sales during the initial phase of operations of the ﬁrm.
In the next section we sum up the results of the paper. The model is described in Section
2 and we derive the general solution in Section 3. The optimal path to steady state for
more speciﬁc functional forms is characterized in Section 4. Numerical solutions and
sensitivity analysis are simulated in Section 5.
1.1 The Model’s Results
In myopic equilibrium the quantity of a good produced equates the marginal cost of
production to the marginal revenue. In contrast, our results show that when sales take
place the quantity of the good sold exceeds the myopic quantity. The "loss" in current
revenue due to a reduction in myopic mark-up is balanced by the added future revenues
obtained from the rise in goodwill attributed to the increased sales. Another conclusion
3In Kalish (1985) and Horsky (1990), as in our model, prices are determined endogenously unlike
other works that either have no prices or in which prices are kept constant. However, unlike our paper,
both Kalish and Horsky have no advertising or goodwill and instead diﬀusion and adoption of durable
goods are captured by accumulated sales aﬀecting current sales.
4of our model is that when both advertising and sales take place simultaneously, there is
equality between the marginal net cost of goodwill generated by either current sales or
by current advertisement. We also ﬁnd that the quantity produced along the optimal
path increases when either goodwill or advertising increase while all other factors stay
constant. The price along the optimal path, however, increases only when advertising
decreases and is not aﬀected by changes in goodwill.
By two examples satisfying our general speciﬁcations we learn that when customers
have little or no knowledge about the nature of the product, the ﬁrm may launch an
advertising campaign prior to sales, a strategy typical to the movies and publishing
industries, among others. On the other hand, when a ﬁrm decides to produce a new
brand of a familiar product, circumstances exist in which the ﬁrm should commence
sales and delay advertising to a later stage or even terminate advertising entirely, e.g.,
Crocs shoes.
We then assume, in order to obtain an interior solution, full convexity of the model’s
functions. We also assume more speciﬁc functional forms, which also include constant
demand elasticity. Then, two distinct alternative strategies emerge, one for high demand
elasticity and one for low. When the demand elasticity the ﬁrm faces is low, the ﬁrm
starts its operations with a high level of advertising and gradually reduces it to the steady
state level. During that time the stock of goodwill and the price increase continuously
to their steady state levels while sales can increase, decrease or ﬂuctuate.
In a solution typical for high demand elasticity, a ﬁrm begins with low levels of sales and
advertising that gradually increase. This process may continue until steady state levels
are attained or, alternatively, at some point in time when the advertising level reaches
a maximum from which it descends to its steady state level. During the decline of
advertising, sales may increase or decrease. In both cases, from inception up to the time
it reaches steady state, the stock of goodwill monotonously increases. The price along
5the optimal path is aﬀected only by advertising, increasing when advertising declines
and vice versa.
The economic intuition of the diﬀerence between the solutions of high and low demand
elasticity is as follows: A ﬁrm initially seeks a quick build-up of its stock of goodwill in
order to quickly raise the demand for its product. When the demand elasticity is low,
a massive increase in the quantity sold will cause a considerable drop in the product’s
price. Hence, in the low elasticity case, the ﬁrm prefers to build-up goodwill by using
advertising rather than excess sales. In the case of high demand elasticity, however, a
massive increase in the quantity sold reduces the price only marginally, thus learning-
by-buying becomes a relatively cheap way to build-up goodwill compared to advertising.
When the model with speciﬁc functional forms is solved numerically for several sets
of parameter values, the results of these simulations support the analytical solution.
In addition, by running alternative values of some of the parameters the simulations
provide a partial sensitivity analysis of the model.
2 The Model
Consider a ﬁrmthat produces and markets a unique good that no other ﬁrm is producing.
Such a good may be either a diﬀerentiated product in an industry in which other ﬁrms
produce close substitutes of the good with diﬀerent brand names, or there are no close
substitutes in the market and the ﬁrm is a monopoly. In both cases, the ﬁrm has market
power and can generate customer goodwill (GW), A(t), to increase the quantity of its
product sold at a given price. Thus, X (t),the quantity of the ﬁrm’s product demanded at
time t, is a decreasing function of P (t), the price at time t, and an increasing function of
the stock of GW prevailing at time t, A(t). Accordingly, X (t) = X (P (t),A(t)), where
6∂X
∂P < 0 and ∂X




and by assumption 1 < ￿X,P < ∞.4
For convenience, and without loss of generality, we choose X (t) and A(t) as the in-
dependent variables in the current demand function facing the ﬁrm so that the price
becomes a function of the two of them, i.e., P (t) = P (X (t),A(t)), ∂P
∂X < 0, ∂2P
∂X2 ≥ 0
and ∂P
∂A > 0. The GW, A(t), is a stock variable generated by the ﬁrms advertisement I




= (g(X (t)) + h(I (t)))(1 − A(t)) − ψA(t). (1)
The term g(X) in the above equation of motion (1) is the current sales multiplier in the
generation of GW, where
∂g
∂X > 0. The contribution of current sales to the stock of GW
is either due to the eﬀect it has on the willingness of the customer to buy in the near
future more of the product (i.e., repeated sales) or by the buyer informing others about
the product he just bought and consumed, thus creating goodwill in others as well (i.e.,
word of mouth) and this increases the willingness to buy. The variable I (t) denotes
advertisement, an investment in GW independent of the ﬁrm’s sales. h(I) denotes the
advertisement multiplier in the generation of GW, where ∂h
∂I > 0. The parameter ψ
is the constant rate of GW decay as a result of forgetfulness and entrance of newer
products. The index (1 − A) measures the remaining potential of the ﬁrm’s GW and
in the equation of motion it implies decreasing returns to investment in the stock of
GW. Note that (1) implies that the maximum amount of GW is normalized to 1, and
0 ≤ A(t) < 1, since, as A approaches 1, ˙ A turns negative and A declines. Thus, A(t) is
the proportion of maximum goodwill utilized by the ﬁrm to enhance the demand for its
product. To sum up the arguments: the GW, A, is aﬀected by advertisement, I, and by
4In an industry with many ﬁrms, each of which producies a unique good that is a close substitute
of each of the other goods produced by the ﬁrms in the industry, the demand elasticity that each ﬁrm
faces is a ﬁnite number much larger than one, i.e., 1 ￿ ￿X,P < ∞ .
If there is a single monopoly in an industry without close substitutes, its demand elasticity is a
number higher than one but not much higher, i.e., 1 < ￿X,P ￿ ∞.
7learning-by-buying (word of mouth and repeated sales) represented by the ﬁrm’s output
X. In addition, A is bounded between zero and one and displays decreasing returns to
investment.5
The ﬁrm bears the costs of producing output X, C1 (X) as well as the cost of adver-
tisement I, C2 (I). Both cost functions have positive ﬁrst derivatives and non-negative
second derivatives. Accordingly, the current proﬁt function, π (t), is
π(t) = P (t)X (t) − C1 (X (t)) − C2 (I (t)).
The discount rate in the economy is a given positive parameter r < 1. All variables
are functions of time t, although in what follows t is omitted unless it is essential for
understanding the equations. Accordingly, the variables of our model are A, a state
variable with λ as its co-state, and the control variables X and I. Note that both X and
I can only be non-negative. In this paper we are interested in the optimal strategy of
a ﬁrm around its inception, i.e., we are essentially interested in the solution beginning
with A(0) = 0. The ﬁrm maximizes the following inter-temporal proﬁt function at time





−rt [P (X,A)X − C1 (X) − C2 (I)]dt
s.t. ˙ A = (g(X) + h(I))(1 − A) − ψA;
A(0) = 0, −I ≤ 0 and − X ≤ 0. (2)
We adopt the plausible assumption of r ≤ ψ, i.e., r, now standing for the alternative
cost of aggregate consumption in terms of enhanced investment in the stock of GW, is
smaller than the decay rate of GW, ψ.
5Note that for g (X) ≡ 0 and h(I) ≡ I, we obtain an equation of motion similar to that of Gould
as well as to that of Vidale and Wolfe. Except for the term (1 − A) this equation is also similar to the
equation of motion of Nerlove and Arrow.
8In what follows we specify necessary conditions for an optimal solution for the ﬁrm and
try to typify some solutions that satisfy these conditions.
3 The Model’s Solution
We ﬁrst derive the overall necessary conditions for any of these three types of the model’s
solutions: a corner solution, an internal solution or a null solution. To this end, let H(t)
designate the Hamiltonian formulated from L(0) below:
H(t) = P (X (t),A(t))X (t) − C1 (X (t)) − C2 (I (t))+
+λ[(g(X (t)) + h(I (t)))(1 − A(t)) − ψA(t)] + δ (t)I (t) + η (t)X (t),
where δ(t) and η(t) are the Kunn-Tucker multipliers associated with the two inequalities.
Three conditions then follow:
1) ∂H
∂X = PX (X,A)X + P (X,A) − C￿
1 (X) + λg￿ (X)(1 − A) + η = 0, where η ≥
0, and ηX = 0.
2) ∂H
∂I = −C￿
2 (I) + λh￿ (I)(1 − A) + δ = 0, where δ ≥ 0, and δI = 0.
3) ˙ λ = rλ − ∂H
∂A = λ(r + ψ + g(X) + h(I)) − PA(X,A)X,
where an apostrophe in a superscript of a single-variable function designates the ﬁrst
derivative of the function, a multi-variable function with a variable in its subscript stands
for the derivative of the function with respect to the variable and a dot above a function
denotes derivation with respect to time.
The necessary conditions speciﬁed in section 3.1 follow from the three conditions above.
Then, the necessary conditions are used to obtain two examples of corner solutions and
to characterize in detail a model with speciﬁc functional forms as described in Section
4. It should be noted that in our model there is always a maximum that satisﬁes the
necessary conditions, i.e., there is always either an internal solution or a corner one. The
9null solution X (t) = I (t) = A(t) = 0 is always a local optimum and if costs are higher
than beneﬁts it is also the global optimum. In what follows, we characterize solutions
with positive-valued variables.
3.1 Necessary Conditions
The diﬀerentiation of the Hamiltonian with respect to advertising, I (condition 2 above),
yields the (in)equality of the shadow value of the marginal product of advertisement
I, λh￿ (I)(1 − A) to the marginal current cost C￿
2 (I), i.e.,
λh
￿ (I)(1 − A) ≤ C
￿
2 (I) =⇒ λ ≤
C ￿
2 (I)
h￿ (I)(1 − A)
, (3)
where 0 ≤ A < 1 and equality holds in (3) when I > 0. When advertising is pos-
itive, equality holds between
C ￿
2 (I)
h￿(I)(1−A), the imputed cost of a unit of ˙ A generated by
advertising, and λ, the shadow price of a unit of GW.
The diﬀerentiation of the Hamiltonian with respect to the output X (see condition 1 above)
yields the (in)equality between the sum of the marginal revenue of X plus the value of
the marginal contribution of X to ˙ A, and the current marginal cost of X, MC (X),
namely
MRX (X,A) + λg
￿(X)(1 − A) ≤ C
￿
1 (X) =⇒ λ ≤
C￿
1 (X) − MRX (X,A)
g￿(X)(1 − A)
(4)
where 0 ≤ A < 1, and for X > 0 equality holds. MRX (X,A) is the marginal revenue of
X and MRX (X,A) ≡
∂(XP(X,A))
∂X = P (X,A)+XPX (X,A). The marginal contribution
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Figure 1: Investment in Goodwill of Learning by Buying
The case of positive output X and equality in (4) is depicted in Figure 1. While a
monopolistic myopic ﬁrm in a static model equates MRX to MC (X), i.e., produces
the output Xm shown in Figure 1, in our dynamic model the ﬁrm produces an output
Xo, where Xo > Xm. The additional marginal cost above the marginal revenue at the
optimal output Xo is equal to the shadow value of the marginal contribution of sales to
the creation of future GW.
The rate of change of the shadow price, ˙ λ, is obtained by diﬀerentiating the Hamiltonian
with respect to the stock of GW, A, (see 3 above) and is given in (5) below, for λ > 0.
˙ λ = (r + ψ + g (X) + h(I))λ − MRA (X,A) =⇒
˙ λ + MRA(X,A)
λ







= XPA (X,A), is the marginal revenue of A. In the
second line of (5) the two terms on the right-hand side of the equation are the rate of
growth of the GW price, ˙ λ/λ plus the current marginal revenue of GW, MRA, normal-
ized by its price λ. On the right-hand side of (5), the ﬁrst two terms, r + ψ, are the
maintenance costs per unit of GW and the last two terms measure the contribution to
˙ A of learning by buying, g (X) and advertisement, h(I).
11The necessary conditions (3), (4) and (5), the equation of motion (1), the initial con-
dition and the non-negativity restrictions speciﬁed in (2), all together determine the
solution of the maximization problem speciﬁed in (2).
3.2 The Model’s Internal and Corner Solutions
From equations (3) and (4) and after eliminating λ we obtain
L(X,A) ≡
C￿







Since the variable A fulﬁlls 0 ≤ A < 1, the term (1 − A) is positive and it therefore, was
eliminated from (6). The above equation states that the optimum can consist either of
an internal solution in which both X and I are positive or of a corner solution in which
either X or I vanish.
3.2.1 The Internal Solution
When in the optimum both I and X are positive and A fulﬁlls 0 ≤ A < 1, then equality
holds in (6). This is a case of an internal solution. Additional conditions on the functions
of the model, on top of the conditions assumed in section 2 are needed to ensure the
existence of an internal solution. Such additional conditions are henceforth assumed:
1) additional conditions on the demand function P (X,A), i.e., ∂P
∂X < 0,
∂2p
∂X2 > 0 and
∂P
∂A > 0, 2) conditions on the advertisement multiplier h(I), i.e., ∂h
∂I > 0, ∂2h
∂I2 ≤ 0 and 3)





In an internal solution, the ﬁrm has two current policy instruments. The ﬁrst is adver-
tisement I that increases the future stock of GW, A, and thus shifts upward the future
price for a given quantity demanded with its future revenues. The second is the quantity
sold of the product, X, with its double impact of current income generation through
sales and the increase of future stock of GW, A, and with it future revenues.
12Accordingly, in the internal solution equalities hold in (3) and (4) from which we obtain,
C￿







The equality in (7) is between the marginal net cost of GW generated either by current































dI = 0. (8)








￿2 [h￿ (I)C ￿￿










1 (X) − MRX)
￿,
where MRX is a function of X and A only. The inequality in (9) is proved as follows:
Since the ﬁrst-order derivatives g￿(X), h￿ (I), C￿
1 (X) and C ￿
2 (I) are positive, the second
order derivatives of the cost functions C1 and C2 are also positive and the second order
derivatives of h and g are non-positive, it follows that the numerator of the equation
above is positive. Since C￿
1 (X)−MRX (X,A) must be positive due to the non-negativity
of λ in (4) and because
∂MRX(X,A)
∂X is negative due to the negative slope of the demand
curve, the denominator of the equation above is also positive. Positive numerator and
denominator imply that the whole expression is positive.



















1 (X) − MRX (X,A))
.
13The inequality in (10) is proved similarly to the proof of the inequality in (9).
In (3) we obtained λ as a function of I and A alone. By diﬀerentiating the expression
with respect to time we now obtain,
˙ λ =
h￿C2” − C ￿
2h￿￿
(h￿)




h￿ (1 − A)




2 I be the elasticity with respect to advertising, I, of C ￿
2 − the marginal
cost of advertising. In the same way Eh￿ = h￿￿
h￿ I is the elasticity of h￿ − the marginal
advertising multiplier of GW with respect to advertising. Then by substituting λ from
(3) and the elasticities EC￿














Equation (12) implies that the rate of change,
˙ λ
λ , is decomposed into two components:
current and inter-temporal. The current component measures the net cost of the rate
of change of advertising,
˙ I
I, and the inter-temporal component measures the growth of
GW, ˙ A, relative to the remaining growth potential of GW, (1 − A).
By substituting (11) into (5) together with (3) and (1) we obtain the expression for the






















for 0 ≤ A < 1 and 0 < I. Later on we will characterize the internal solution by using
the equations derived here.
6When I = 0, either there is an inequality in (3) and then ˙ I = I = 0 or there is an equality in
(3), i.e., λ =
C ￿
2 (0)
h￿(0)(1−A) and then ˙ λ in (5) must be positive for both λ and I to grow. Only then can
we obtain (11). From ˙ λ > 0 we obtain (r + ψ + g (X (0,A)) + h(0)) >
h￿(0)
C ￿
2 (0) (1 − A)MRA (X,A) and










(1−A) − (g(X (0,A)) + h(0))
￿
. For suﬃciently small
A the term in the RHS is negative, but ˙ I cannot be negative when I = 0. Hence, in an internal solution,
I cannot be zero for small A, i.e., I is discontinuous at I = 0. Therefore, I = 0 =⇒ ˙ I = 0. Note that it
can also be shown that ˙ I (A = 1,I = 0) = 0.
143.2.2 Corner Solution I: I (t = 0) = 0
The relation between the (in)equalities in the necessary conditions and corner solution
I is as follows: If in the optimum I (t) = 0 and X (t) > 0, then 0 ≤ A(t) < 1, equality
holds in (4) and (weak) inequality holds in (3). In this case a weak inequality holds in
(6) as well and the left-hand side of the equation, L(X (t),A(t)) and the right-hand
side of (6), R(I (t)) fulﬁll L(X (t),A(t)) ≤ R(I (t)).
If at time t the left-hand side of (6), L(X,A(t)), is for all non-negative pairs (I,X)
less than R(I), the equation’s right-hand side, then the optimal solution at time t is a
corner solution with I (t) = 0 and X (t) > 0, i.e., at time t the ﬁrm produces a positive
quantity of good X and does not advertise.
To demonstrate such a solution consider the following example:
First, let h(I) = I2 + 2I and C2 (I) = I2 + I. Then, for I > 0, the right-hand side of
(6), R(I) =
1+1/2I
1+1/I . R(I) is monotonic increasing with I in the domain 0 < I < ∞, and
obtains its values in the interval 1/2 < R(I) < 1.









Then, the left-hand side of (6) is L(X,A) = 1
4 − A(10 − 2X).
When A = 0, the price function is P (X) = 1.75, i.e., the ﬁrm is facing then a demand
curve of inﬁnite elasticity and is therefore a price-taker. The left-hand side of (6),
L(X,0) = 0.25 < R(I),the right-hand side of (6) for all I. Therefore at A = 0 the
solution is a corner solution with X (t = 0) > 0 and I (t = 0) = 0. Due to learning-by-
buying, the initial sale creates a positive GW, A. Once A is positive, there are suﬃciently
large X￿s so that L(X,A) is larger than R(I = 0) =0.5. Thus, when A is positive there
15may be an internal solution where both X and I are positive. Initially, however, I (0) = 0
and X (0) > 0, which is a corner solution.
Such a pattern can be traced in markets of diﬀerentiated products with many brands and
high demand elasticity for each brand. A start-up ﬁrm in such a market will ﬁrst have to
distinguish its product through learning by buying and commence with advertising at a
later stage. Examples of such ﬁrms include start-up restaurants, small stores, confection
manufacturers and other small producers of a diﬀerentiated product (Crocs shoes).
3.2.3 Corner Solution II: X (t = 0) = 0
If in the optimum at time t there is a corner solution in which I (t) > 0, X (t) = 0 and
0 ≤ A(t) < 1, then L(0,A(t)), the left-hand side of equation (6), is larger or equal to
the equation’s right hand side, R(I (t)). Equality must hold in (3) and (weak) inequality
hold in (4).
If in the optimum at time t the left-hand side of (6), L(X,A(t)) where 0 ≤ A(t) < 1, is
larger than the equation’s right-hand side, R(I) for all non-negative pairs (I,X), then
the optimal solution is a corner solution with I (t) > 0 and X (t) = 0. Namely, at time
t the ﬁrm advertises but does not produce.
To demonstrate such a corner solution, consider the example in corner solution I but





A(100 − X), for 0 ≤ X ≤ 100
0, otherwise.
.
In this case, at time t = 0 since A(0) = 0 there is no demand for the ﬁrm’s product
and R(I) < L(X,0) for all X and I. Therefore, at time t = 0 the ﬁrm advertises
but does not sell. It may begin to sell as well only when the GW exceeds the level
of A = 0.01, which is the level at which the demand price may justify sales. Indeed,
16when A ≥ 0.01 there are positive pairs (X,I) for which equality prevails in (6). Such a
pattern is typical to the movies industry, sport events, publishing of celebrities’ books,
among others. Note that in such cases the beginning of sales is preceded by a promotion
campaign.
In the next section we introduce speciﬁc functional forms into our model in order to gain
more insight into the behavior of the ﬁrm along the optimal path in an internal solution.
4 The Model with Speciﬁc Functional Forms
In this section we assume speciﬁc functional forms that satisfy the conditions for an
internal solution. These functional forms are suﬃciently general to typify the industry,
yet they are suﬃciently speciﬁc to allow full characterization of the model’s solution.
4.1 The Functional Forms
First, we assume that the inverted demand function, P (X,A), is the constant elasticity
function P = P0 (1 + sA)X−γ, where P0,γ, and s are given parameters, P0 > 0 ,
0 < γ < 1 and 1 ≤ s < 10. The parameter s measures the maximum capacity of
goodwill. Note that the demand elasticity, ￿X,p = 1
γ , fulﬁlls 1 < 1
γ < ∞.7
Next we assume that g (X) = βX and h(I) = αI where α and β are positive given
parameters. The cost functions are C1 (X) = bX and C2 (I) = c
2I2 where c is a given
positive parameter. Thus, the revenue function is R(X,A) = P0 (1 + sA)X1−γ, with
7Such a demand function is, for example, the demand of a community of N households, all of
which have the same quasi-linear utility function u(xi,A,zi) = Ko (1 + sA)x
(1−γ)
i +zi, where xi is the
quantity of the ﬁrm’s product consumed by household i and zi stands for all other goods consumed by
the household. Then, the inverted demand function, P0 (1 + sA)X−γ, is the inverted aggregate demand
function of the community of N, where Po = Ko(1 − γ)Nγ and X =
￿
xi.
17marginal revenue functions, MRX = P0 (1 − γ)(1 + sA)X−γ = (1 − γ)P (X,A) and
MRA = P0sX1−γ. Substituting the above in (2) we obtain the Lagrangian Ls(0) in








P0 (1 + sA)X







s.t. ˙ A = (βX + αI)(1 − A) − ψA;
A(0) = 0, −I ≤ 0 and − X ≤ 0. (15)
The solutions to the maximization of Ls(0) in (15) is internal and has no corner solutions
(see Appendix A).
4.2 The Solution of the Model with the Speciﬁc Functional
Forms
We ﬁrst compute the current quantity and price of the product by substituting the
speciﬁc functional forms speciﬁed in section 4.1 into (7). We obtain,
X =



















and since X must be ﬁnite there is an upper bound of advertising Imax = bα
βc. It should
be noted that Imax is independent of γ, and has the same value for all γ. Therefore,
X =
￿
P0 (1 − γ)(1 + sA)
βc















γ (1 + sA)
> 0 (18)
18Note that by substituting X into P = P0 (1 + sA)X−γ we obtain the price along the











∂A = 0 and ∂P
∂I < 0. Hence, a change in the stock of GW does not aﬀect the
equilibrium price, whereas an increase of advertisement along the optimal path reduces
the price.
4.2.1 The Singular Curves
The characterization of the model’s solution is done by the technique of phase diagrams:
in the (A,I) plane we plot the singular curves ˙ I = 0 and ˙ A = 0 and their intersection,
the steady state point. We will then determine the direction of movement over time on
the (A,I) plane and use this information to ﬁnd the optimal path to the steady state.
At ﬁrst we calculate the equations of the singular curves.
By substituting from section 4.1 the speciﬁc functional forms into (13) and equating the
result to zero, we obtain the singular curve ˙ I = 0.









(1 − A)P0 (X)
1−γ = 0, (20)
where 0 < I < Imax. By substituting the speciﬁc functional forms into (1) and equating
the result to zero we obtain the singular curve ˙ A = 0,
˙ A ≡ (βX + αI)(1 − A) − ψA = 0, (21)
from which we obtain the following expression for A as a function of I and X along the
curve ˙ A = 0,
A| ˙ A=0 =
βX + αI
βX + αI + ψ
. (22)
Consequently, 0 ≤ A| ˙ A=0 < 1.
194.3 Phase Diagrams Analysis
In this section we characterize and analyze the solution of the functional forms model
introduced in the previous section by using the phase diagrams technique. In the previous
section we calculate the singular curves and in Appendix B we calculate the layouts and
slopes of the two singular curves ˙ I = 0 and ˙ A = 0 in the [A,I] plane. The two curves are
displayed in ﬁgures 2 and 3. The directions of growth of A and I in various locations on
the [A,I] plane are depicted by arrows in ﬁgures 2 and 3 and are calculated in Appendix
B.
There are two typical solutions to our model with speciﬁc functional forms, which are
described by cases I and case II below. In Case I are included models whose demand elas-
















is the demand elasticity and in the model with speciﬁc functional forms ￿Xp = 1/γ. Case








< ￿Xp < ∞.
Below we present the two cases.
4.3.1 Case I: s
(
ψ
(r+ψ)+(1+s)) ≤ γ < 1.
Case I is depicted in Figure 2. The domain of γ in case I can be divided into two
consecutive intervals, s
1+s ≤ γ < 1, and s
(
ψ
(r+ψ)+(1+s)) ≤ γ < s
1+s. The price elasticities of
















1+sA = µp,A, for all A (since 0 ≤ A ≤ 1), in the ﬁrst interval
γ = µp,X > s
1+s > µp,A. Thus, in the ﬁrst interval of case I, the price elasticity with
respect to quantity is larger than the price elasticity with respect to GW. The second
interval in Case I extends the validity of the results depicted in Figure 2 to slightly lower
γ￿s. Note that for ﬁrms with ψ much larger than r, the optimal path depicted in Figure
2 still prevails, even if γ is considerably smaller than s
1+s.
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Figure 2: The Optimal Path in Case I.
The singular curve ˙ I = 0 inFigure 2 has two branches that connect at point (γImax,A(γImax))
where its slope is inﬁnite. The slope of the lower branch of the curve is negative while
the upper branch has a positive slope. Both branches of ˙ I = 0 terminate at A = 1, the
upper branch at I = Imax and the lower at I = 0. The singular curve ˙ A = 0 in Figure
2 starts from the A-axis at A = A > 0 and ends at (Imax,1) at the upper right hand
corner and its slope is always positive.
The intersection of the two singular curves, ˙ I = 0 and ˙ A = 0 yields the steady state
point (I∗,A∗). The optimal path of a new ﬁrm depicted in Figure 2 is characterized by
initial high advertising expenditure and sizable sales. As the stock of GW increases due
to advertisement and learning by buying, advertising declines. The quantity sold may,
however, increase or decrease while the GW increases. The reason for this ambiguity
is that while A increases along the optimal path and contributes to an increase of X
(see (18)), I declines along the path and therefore has the opposite eﬀect on X thus
leaving the end result of X ambiguous. The price P (X,A) however increases along the
optimal path, as indicated by (19). When the ﬁrm starts with an initial stock of GW
A0, A0 > A∗ , advertisement increases while GW decreases and the price decreases. The
quantity sold, X, is ambiguous along the optimal path, as it is for the case of A0 < A∗.
The rationale behind the ambiguity of the change in sales along the optimal path is that
21two opposite eﬀects are inﬂuencing the sale process. The ﬁrst causes an increase of X
by an upward shift of the demand curve, generated by an increase of GW. The second
eﬀect is due to a movement on the demand curve which cause a decline of sales and a
price raise.
Low demand elasticity products are often essential goods produced by a few ﬁrms in
markets that are diﬃcult to enter.8




The solution of this case is depicted in Figures 3a and 3b, where γ is relatively low.
0 = I &
max I γ
max I
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Figure 3a: The Optimal Path of Case II- Steady State to the Right of An.
In Figures 3a and 3b the two branches of the singular curve ˙ I = 0 are separated. The
lower branch is bell-shaped with a peak at An and the upper branch is U-shaped with
its bottom also at An . As in case I, the singular curve ˙ A = 0 intersects the lower branch
8An example to a low demand elasticity product is Lipitor, which is a drug taken by patients for
cholesterol reduction. Lipitor is an essential drug protected by a patent. Another example to Case I
product is aeroplanes. Note that potential buyers to which these ﬁrms’ advertisement aims are not the
general public but a speciﬁc part of it. In the case of a new drug the targeted population are medical
doctors and in the case of new aeroplanes the target population are aviators and aviation corporations.
22of ˙ I = 0 at the steady state point (I∗,A∗). In Figure 3a the steady state is to the left of
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Figure 3b: The Optimal Path of Case II- Steady State to the Left of An.
In both ﬁgures, the optimal path of a ﬁrm with initial zero GW starts from low levels of
advertising and sales that increase as the GW increases. In Figure 3b, where the steady
state is to the left of An, advertising and sales increase monotonously towards steady
state. In Figure 3a, on the other hand, the steady state is to the right of An; advertising,
I, overshoots its steady state level I∗ and approaches it from above. Nevertheless, cases
I and II do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly. Note that the optimal path on the right-hand side of
the steady state point in 3a (3b) is the mirror image of the optimal path on the left-hand
side of the steady state point in 3b (3a).
High demand elasticity that prevails in case II is typical of diﬀerentiated products, where
all brands of a diﬀerentiated product are close substitutes of each other and each brand
is produced by a diﬀerent ﬁrm. Consequently, each ﬁrm is facing a demand curve of
high elasticity and has limited monopoly power.9
9Examples of markets of perishable goods with high demand elasticity are markets of prepared
food items, confections, clothing and ﬂights of commercial airlines. Flats in condominiums, cars and
inexpensive watches are examples of high demand elasticity of durable goods.
23This situation raises the question of why the optimal paths in Case I and Case II diﬀer?
When answering this question we should ﬁrst note that a massive build-up of GW
through learning-by-buying requires sales beyond the myopic equilibrium level of sales.
In Case I, since the demand elasticity is higher than one but close to it, the shape of
the demand curve is such that a sizeable increase in sales entails a considerable price
reduction. Therefore, a build-up of GW in Case I by learning-by-buying will drive the
price level far below the price of maximum current proﬁts, thus rendering learning-
by-buying far more expensive than advertising. Accordingly, in our model, the initial
build-up of a GW stock in Case I is done by advertising and as sales and GW stock grow,
advertising gradually declines. In Case II, in which demand elasticity is high, the reverse
is true and a massive expansion of sales causes only a slight reduction of price, rendering
the learning-by-buying process the preferred engine for building up initial GW.
5 Simulations of the Model
In the present section, speciﬁc numerical values are chosen for the parameters of the
model with speciﬁc functional forms discussed in section 4 and numerical solutions are
calculated by simulations. The simulation design is based on the set of necessary condi-
tions for the optimal solution of the speciﬁc functional forms model.
In the following analysis we focus on two values of γ, the demand price elasticity, namely
γ = 0.7 of Case I and γ = 0.3 of Case II. For each of these γ’s we assign a Base Model
with the same set of parameters other than γ, as follows:
Table 1: The Base Model
α = 0.0007 β = 0.0007 ψ = 0.2 s = 1.5
r = 0.1 b = 2.0 c = 0.0005 T = 50
24where T is the number of years simulated. Figures 4 and 5 describe the optimal path of
the Base Models for γ=0.7 and γ=0.3, respectively, where variables I,A,X and P are
each depicted as a function of time. Figure 4 corresponds to Case I as depicted by the
phase diagram in Figure 2, and Figure 5 corresponds to Case II as depicted by the phase
diagram in Figure 3a. Note that while the endogenous variables in the phase diagrams
are implicit functions of time, in the simulation results time appears as an independent
variable.
Another feature that distinguishes the simulation solution from the analytic is that
the former portrays a numerical solution to a numerical problem, whereas the analytic
solution covers the entire range of the problem parameters.
The following table presents the initial, ﬁnal, maximum and minimum values of the
resulting variables of the two base cases.







I 29.72 27.89 174.42 174.09 @
A 0 0.09 0 0.43
X 0.67 0.80 7.49 39.03
P 6.62 6.62 2.73 2.73
π∗ § 3.52 21.03
@ The maximum value of I(t) is I(t=3.5)=182.85, see also Figure 5.
Thus, Table 2 presents an example of Case II as depicted in Figure 3a.





















































Figure 4a: Optimal path of I and A 
Along the Temporal Axis for    =0.7. γ
Figure 4b: Optimal path of X and P 
Along the Temporal Axis for    =0.7.
Figures 4 and 5 and Table 2 teach us about the optimal behavioral patterns over time
of a ﬁrm with market power in two distinct cases: one, of a ﬁrm with a low demand
elasticity of 1.43 (γ=0.7) and the second of a ﬁrm facing a higher demand elasticity
of 3.33 (γ=0.3). In the ﬁrst case, the ﬁrm faces low marginal revenues (of X and A)
relative to the marginal costs (of X and I). Consequently, the ﬁrm rapidly approaches
steady state levels typiﬁed by low levels of sales, advertising and GW. Thus, case I is
characterized by practically a myopic behavior of the ﬁrm (see the ﬁrst column in Table
2.). In the second case of higher demand elasticity, the ﬁrm increases its sales over
time, creating through the learning-by-buying eﬀect an increasing stock of GW. The
resulting demand creation (a shift of the demand curve to the right) is strengthened by
relatively high levels of advertising expenditure that further increase the stock of GW.
Consequently, the convergence to steady state is relatively long. Thus, the second case


















































Figure 5a: The Optimal Path of I and A 
Along The Temporal Axis for      =0.3
Figure 5b:The Optimal Path of X and P 
Along the Temporal Axis for     =0.3 γ
Table 3 below presents results of a sensitivity analysis we performed on the base case of
γ = 0.3. In each run, represented by a row in Table 3, we changed one of the base case
parameters while keeping the rest of the parameters unchanged . We do not present
results of the sensitivity analysis based on the case of γ = 0.7 because these results are
similar to those of the case of γ = 0.3 and since the dynamics in the case of γ = 0.7
are less signiﬁcant. The Base Model with all its variations is characterized by the phase
diagram depicted in Figure 3a, except for the variation (raw) of b = 2.5 (see Table 3)
that is typiﬁed by the phase diagram in Figure 3b. In all these cases, the ﬁrm adopts a
dynamic policy with aggressive sales and advertising that result in increasing GW and
with it demand creation. Indeed, the higher the initial advertising (column 2) and sales
(column 4), which, in turn are associated with lower initial current proﬁts (which are
sometimes even negative, see column 6), the higher are the discounted proﬁts,
￿ T
0 e−rtπdt
(column 6). In general, as listed in Table 3, an increase in a cost parameter (such as
ψ and b) reduces total output, proﬁts, advertising and GW stock, while an increase in
beneﬁcial parameters (such as s,α and β) has the opposite eﬀect.
27Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis of the Base Case for γ = 0.3





















































































































@The optimal path of I in the case of γ = 0.3 corresponds to Figure 3a, and has a maximum
designated by ˆ I. This is true for all cases other than b =2.5, which is described in Figure 3b.
￿ π is the value of the current proﬁt and
￿ T
0 e−rtπdt is the sum of the discounted proﬁts.
Another feature worth noting in the simulation runs is the lack of price variations, not
only within each run where variations are less than one percent of the price, but also
between the diﬀerent runs. Except for the case of b = 2.5, in which the price is 3.5, the
price in all the other cases is about 2.7. It stands to reason that the marginal cost of X,
b, is the essential factor in the price determination. It is interesting to note that most
of the literature cited in this paper assumes the price is constant over time, whereas in
our case, this is an endogenous result.
Below are additional features about the sensitivity analysis:
28• Changes in s, the eﬀectiveness coeﬃcient of A: Initially, the quantity of X is deter-
mined mostly by the elasticity of demand that is a static consideration. Therefore,
the spread of the initial quantities sold for the diﬀerent levels of s is relatively
small. Final sales, however, are determined mainly by the ﬁrm’s policy along the
optimal path and therefore the spread of ﬁnal sales is greater. The impact of the
dynamic behavioral patterns of the ﬁrm is further demonstrated by the diﬀerent
advertisement expenditures for the various levels of s and the corresponding GW
stocks.
• Changes in ψ, the coeﬃcient of GW’s decay: An increase in the decay coeﬃcient
hinders the growth of stock A and reduces its dynamic impact. Since in this case
of γ = 0.3 the dynamic impact is considerable, changes in ψ are signiﬁcant.
• An increase in b, the marginal cost of production of X, to 2.5: The build-up of
X, I, and A is gradual and steady, maintaining a high and constant price level.
Of all runs depicted in Table 3, this is the only one typiﬁed by Figure 3b whereas
all the other runs are typiﬁed by Figure 3a.
• An increase to .001 of α and β, the coeﬃcients of advertisement and sales in
the equation of motion, respectively: The result is similar to the result from an
increase in s. The result is an increase in I, X and A along the optimal path.
296 Appendices
6.1 Appendix A: Nonexistence of Corner Solutions in the Model
with Speciﬁc Functional Forms
In this appendix, we argue that the two conditions in the general case for Corner So-
lutions 1 and 2 in section 3.2, are not fulﬁlled in the solution to our speciﬁc functional
forms model.
To show this we substitute the parameters of the speciﬁc functional forms model for
A = 0 into (6) to obtain (23),
L(X) =







In Corner Solution 2 initially advertising I (0) > 0 and X (0) = 0. For this outcome to
occur L(0) in (23) must be greater than R(I). However, since in (23) L(X = 0) = −∞,
there is no non-negative I, for which R(I) < −∞. This means that in our speciﬁc
example, advertising without production is never optimal.
Initially, i.e., when A(0) = 0, Corner Solution 1 has only production and no advertising;
hence, the initial advertising must be I (0) = 0. Substituting this initial investment into
(23) yields
L(X (0)) =
b − Po (1 − γ)X (0)
−γ
β
= λ(0) ≤ R(I (0)) = 0.
Since L(X = 0) = −∞ and L(X = ∞) = b
β > 0, a positive constant x must exist
such that L(x) = 0. Since λ(t = 0) is non-negative, the triplet X (t = 0) = Xmin ,
I (t = 0) = 0 and λ(t = 0) = 0, is the only possible corner solution.10 However, with
positive parameters in(23), a whole range of X > Xmin and positive I and λ exist, which
10Note that x must be equal to xmin(0), and this solution is technically not a corner solution since
equality holds in (23).
30constitutes feasible interior solutions. The optimal solution is, therefore, an interior
solution, possibly with positive X and I.11
6.2 Appendix B: The Phase Diagrams
6.2.1 Calculating the Singular Curve ˙ I = 0.




































By substituting the ﬁrst term that multiplies dI above, which is also the ﬁrst term in
(20), with the second term in (20) and then substituting for X and its partial diﬀerentials


































The above equation implies,
11However, if b, for example, is suﬃciently small, x is suﬃciently large and x, I = 0 and λ = 0, can
constitute the optimal solution. Note that in this case, I = 0 and λ = 0 for all t, and the solution is










































Consider the denominator in (24), which is a multiplication of two terms of which the
ﬁrst is always positive. The second term in the multiplication is negative when γImax <
I < Imax and positive when I fulﬁlls 0 < I < γImax. At I = γImax the last term of the
multiplication in the denominator vanishes and with it the whole denominator.
Since X (I = 0) > 0, it follows that A(I = 0)| ˙ I=0 must be equal to 1 for equation (20)
to be fulﬁlled. To see this note that when I = 0 the ﬁrst term in (20) vanishes; hence,











→ 1 for ˙ I in (20)
to vanish. Otherwise, if A|{
˙ I=0
I>0
is less than one, it is clear that in equation (20) ˙ I does






Suppose the numerator in (24) is positive for all I, 0 ≤ I ≤ Imax and A(I), 0 ≤ A(I) ≤ 1
(e.g., when γ ≥ s
1+s) and let A(γImax)| ˙ I=0 be the value of A in ˙ I = 0 when I = γImax.
Then, for each A such that A(γImax)| ˙ I=0 < A ≤ 1 there are two I￿s which satisfy (20).
For A￿s such that A < A(γImax)| ˙ I=0, there are no I￿s that belong to ˙ I = 0 and the
curve does not exist there. In other words, for A, A(γImax)| ˙ I=0 < A ≤ 1, the curve
˙ I = 0 has two branches: in the upper branch I and A are both increasing, and in the
lower branch, when I is decreasing, A is increasing. These two branches of ˙ I = 0 are
depicted in Figures 2a and 2b (in 2a A(γImax)| ˙ I=0 > 0 and in 2b A(γImax)| ˙ I=0 < 0).12
12To ﬁnd out when the curve ˙ I = 0 intersects the I axis we do the following.We substitute A = 0








. Next, we change the variable I into a variable θ so that
32We now extend the investigation of the curve ˙ I = 0 to include cases in which the
numerator of dI
dA| ˙ I=0 in (24) is negative. First we ﬁnd out when the numerator of (20) is
positive or negative. The ﬁrst term in the numerator is always positive and the second
term is non-negative if
γ
1−γ ≥ s 1−A
1+sA. The right-hand side of the inequality above is a
function of A and s, and is bounded between zero and s. The left-hand side is determined
by γ alone and for γ ≥ s/(1 + s) =⇒
γ
1−γ ≥ s ≥ s 1−A
1+sA. In this case both terms in the
numerator are positive and so is the numerator. In Figure 2a the curve ˙ I = 0 is depicted
as discussed above.
From here on we adopt the plausible assumption r ≤ ψ. The numerator of dI
dA| ˙ I=0 in




γ(1+sA) . We now replace in Num the
term αs
c P0 (X)
1−γ with the term I
(1−A)2 (r(1 − A) + ψ) by using (20) to obtain,
Num =
I
γ (1 + sA)(1 − A)
2 {(ψγ + ψγsA) + (r(1 − A) + ψ)(γ + sA + sγ − s)}.
The sign of Num is characterized by the following cases in which we make the plausible
assumption r ≤ ψ.
Case I 1: γ ≥ s
1+s. In this case all the terms in the numerator are positive for all
feasible A as we already showed above (see Figure 2). Note also that in this case
   ηp,X
    = γ ≥ ηp,A = sA
1+sA ≤ s
1+s, for all 0 < A < 1, where
   ηp,X
    is the price elasticity
I = θImax = θbα








βθ. For γ = 1/2 the equation
can be solved, i.e., m − θ + θ
2 = 0 where the parameter m is,
m =
P0βs
2b2 (r + ψ)
.




2 ≤ 1, which means that the
curve ˙ I = 0 intersects the I axis twice when m < 0.25. If m > 0.25 there is no real solution to θ which
means that ˙ I = 0 does not intersect the I axis and the line ˙ I = 0 is not deﬁned over small A and never
reaches the I axis. When γ ￿= 1/2 the situation is essentially the same. In other words we may have
two or more intersection points of ˙ I = 0 with A = 0, one intersection point or none at all.
33with respect to the quantity demanded, and ηp,A is the price elasticity with respect to
the GW.
Case I 2: s
(
ψ
(r+ψ)+(1+s)) ≤ γ < s
1+s . Like case I1, Num in this case is positive for
0 < A ≤ 1. To see that, ﬁrst note that Num is positive for A = 1 for all γ, because then
sA and (−s) cancel each other out and the remaining terms are positive. Furthermore,
continuity implies that for each γ there are feasible A￿s suﬃciently close to 1 for which
Num is positive. Next, we ﬁnd out if and when Num changes sign when γ < s
1+s. Since
the numerator is continuous in A, to change signs it must vanish at some feasible A, say
0 < ¯ An (γ) < 1, so that for A > ¯ An(γ) the numerator is positive and for A < ¯ An (γ) the
numerator is negative. We solve ¯ An (γ) from the second order equation in A below, in
which the numerator of Num is equated to zero,
−A
2 (rs) + A(ψs(γ + 1) + r(s(2 − γ) − γ)) + [ψγ + (r + ψ)(γ (1 + s) − s)] = 0.
The above is an equation in A2 and therefore may have zero, one or two solutions of A
in the relevant range (0,1). If there is no solution in the relevant segment (0,1), Num
does not change sign. If there is a single solution in the relevant range the sign changes
once and if there are two solutions the sign changes twice. The solution of the above
equation is given below in (25),
¯ An(γ) = rd ± re =
[ψs(γ + 1) + r(s(2 − γ) − γ)]




(ψs(γ + 1) + r(s(2 − γ) − γ))
2 + 4(rs)[ψγ + (γ (1 + s) − s)]
2rs ! "# $
re
Dividing the ﬁrst term (in the square brackets) in the numerator of (25) by the denom-
inator, (2rs), yields, rd = 1
2
&ψ









2 > 1. The above
inequalities follow for ψ/r ≥ 1, s ≥ 1 and 0 < γ < 1. The fact that rd is larger than 1
implies that the solution with the + sign before re in (25) is always larger than 1 and
therefore it is not in the relevant range (0,1).





(r+ψ)+(1+s)) < γ < s
1+s
￿
, the second term in the root in re is
positive. Therefore, the root of the sum of the two terms is larger than the root of the
ﬁrst term alone. Hence, in (25) re > rd and the diﬀerence between them is negative and
therefore ¯ An (γ) = re − rd < 0 is not in the relevant range. In conclusion, as in case
I1, Num does not change its sign. Case I in the text is Case I1+Case I2.
Case II: 0 < γ < s
(
ψ
(r+ψ)+(1+s)). In this case, the second term in the root in (25) is
negative and its absolute value is smaller than the ﬁrst term. Accordingly, contrary to
case I2, the whole root is smaller than the root of only the ﬁrst term. Thus, in (25), for
γ smaller than s
(
ψ
(r+ψ)+(1+s)), re is less then rd; hence ¯ An(γ) = rd−re > 0. Note that for
γ smaller than but close to s
(
ψ
(r+ψ)+(1+s)), re is smaller but close to rd. Therefore, ¯ An(γ)
is positive and close to zero. This means that for small ¯ An (γ), the following inequality
holds A(γImax) > ¯ An(γ) > 0. On the other hand, for γ << s
(
ψ
(r+ψ)+(1+s)) there is no
A(γImax) in ˙ I = 0.
We now return to the determination of the slope of ˙ I = 0. In cases I1 and I2 the
numerator of ∂I
∂A/ ˙ I=0, Num, is positive; hence ˙ I = 0 is as depicted in Figure 2. In case
II, the numerator, Num, changes sign at a single point ¯ An. When this happens, a
change in the sign of the slope of ˙ I = 0 may occur at ¯ An as depicted in Figures 3.13
Next we characterize the curve ˙ A = 0.
6.2.2 Calculating the Singular Curve ˙ A = 0
By diﬀerentiating (21) we obtain,
dI
dA
| ˙ A=0 = −
β ∂X







13If ¯ An < A(γImax) there is no change of sign and the curve ˙ I = 0 is as depicted in Figure 2. The
curve ˙ I = 0 changes signs only if there is no A(γImax).
35From (1) it can be veriﬁed that ˙ A vanishes at A = 0 for I negative, i.e., the intercept
of the curve ˙ A = 0 is negative. On the other hand, when A is close to, but less than 1,
˙ A vanishes for 0 < I < Imax.. To prove this, consider (21) from which we obtain




The right-hand side of (27) can obtain any value in the interval (0,∞) and is a monotonic
increasing function of A. The expression βXmin (A0) is a positive number equal to the
value of X when I = 0. Thus, I solved from (27) for an A that fulﬁlls βXmin (A = 1) <
ψ A
(1−A), is positive. The above analysis implies that the curve ˙ A = 0 must intersect the
A-axis at a point A, 0 < A < 1.
When A approaches 1 from below, the expression, (βX + αI) in ˙ A = 0 must approach
inﬁnity to oﬀset the eﬀect of the decreasing (1 − A). Note that for the expression
(βX + αI) to approach inﬁnity I must approach Imax, since then X approaches inﬁnity.
Thus, the curve ˙ A = 0 ends in (I = Imax,A = 1).
Consider now the slope of ˙ A = 0 in the interval (A,1). First, replace ∂X
∂A in the numerator
in (26) with the term sX
γ(1+sA) from (18) and then substitute (βX + αI) in (26) with
ψA
(1−A)
from (21). After some manipulations the numerator of dI
dA| ˙ A=0 becomes,
βs X
γ(1+sA) (1 − A) −
ψA
(1−A) − ψ.
The ﬁrst term in the expression above is positive while the next two terms are negative.
The ﬁrst term is dominant when A is close to zero, the second term becomes dominant
when A is close to 1. Since the denominator of dI
dA| ˙ A=0 is always positive, when the
numerator is negative the slope dI
dA| ˙ A=0 is positive.
For small A￿s, the values of I in the curve ˙ A = 0 is negative. Therefore, for the curve
˙ A = 0 to intersect the A-axis its slope must become positive already for negative I￿s.
Once the slope becomes positive for a given A it remains positive for all larger A￿s.
36Thus in Figures 2 and 3a the curve ˙ A = 0 intersects ˙ I = 0 at the lower branch with a
negative slope. In Figure 3b, the two curves intersect where both have a positive slope.
6.2.3 Determining the Direction of Growth
Next we proceed with the evaluation of the directions of growth in time of A and I. We











(1 − A) > 0. (28)
This implies that in Figures 2 and 3, above the curve ˙ A = 0, ˙ A is positive and below
the curve ˙ A is negative, as indicated by the horizontal arrows.
Next we substitute the values of the speciﬁc example into (13) and diﬀerentiate the













(1 − γ)(1 − A)P0X
−γ∂X
∂A
, for I > 0.
Then, by substituting ∂X
∂A from (18) into ∂ ˙ I













(1 − γ)(1 − A)
γ (1 + sA)
￿
If 1 − ε < A < 1
for ε sufficiently small
> 0.
(29)
Equation (29) implies that for values of A suﬃciently close to but still smaller than 1,
˙ I is positive to the right of the curve ˙ I = 0 and negative to the left. Note that the
sign of ˙ I reverses itself, if and only if it crosses the singular curve ˙ I = 0. These two
37characteristics are reﬂected in the direction of the vertical arrows as depicted in Figures
2 and 3.
The intersection (I∗,A∗) of the two curves, ˙ I = 0 in (20) and ˙ A = 0 in (21), yields the
steady states depicted in Figures 2 and 3. The optimal path that leads to the steady
state is determined by the directions of the arrows.
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